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  ‘Math is Never Hard’.
Alex Sadikov
ABSTRACT
    The detection of a volumetric attack involves collecting
statistics on the network traffic, and identifying suspicious
activities. We assume that available statistical information
includes the number of  packets and the number of bytes
passed per flow. We apply methods of machine learning to
detect malicious traffic.
    A prototype project is implemented as a module for the
Floodlight  controller.  The  prototype  was  tested  on  the
Mininet  simulation  platform.  The  simulated  topology
includes a number of edge switches, a connected graph of
core switches, and a number of server and user hosts.  The
server  hosts  run  simple  web  servers.   The  user  hosts
simulate web clients.  
    The controller employs Dijkstra's algorithm to find the
best flow in the graph.  The controller periodically polls the
edge switches and provides current and historical statistics
on each active flow. The streaming analytics evaluates the
traffic volume and detects volumetric attacks.
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1. STATISTICS
1.1 Topology
We assume that  the network in question includes a large
number of hosts connected to the edge switches.  The edge
switches are connected to the core switches. And the core
switches  are  connected  to  each  other  by  paths.   In  the
prototype project the topology is known to the controller a
priory.  In  a  real  implementation  the  topology  may  be
discovered  by  the  controller  on  the  fly.  The  controller
manages  flows between the  switches.   It  focuses  on  the
IPv4 protocol and provides everything relevant to address
resolution protocol in the same manner. 
1.2 L3 Switch
When a packet arrives at a source edge switch, the task of
the  controller  is  to  provide  a  path  for  this  packet  to  its
destination.   The  controller  analyzes  the  network  graph,
finds  the  optimal  path  through  core  switches  using
Dijkstra's algorithm, generates appropriate flow rules, and
writes the rules to the switches involved in transmitting the
packet.
The  controller  defines  the  flow  rules  in  terms  of  IP
addresses  (layer  3).  For the source edge switch,  the rule
will be to output the packet to the uplink port.  For the core
switches along the found path, the output ports may depend
on the destination IP address only, so that the actual (and
possible)  flows to  a  particular  destination form a tree as
shown Figure  1.   The  destination edge switch  is  told  to
output  the  packet  to  the  port  associated  with  the  given
destination IP address.
All  the  rules  are  calculated  and  written  to  the  switches
when the first  packet  for  an undefined flow arrives.  The
controller  can  assume  that  the  flow  in  the  opposite
direction, from the destination to the source,  needs to be
implemented too.
The rule for the source edge switch may define the output
port  for a specific flow (a pair of source and destination
addresses).   The  specific  flow  rules  allow  collection  of
traffic statistics on a per-flow basis.
1.3 Collecting Statistics
OpenFlow switches are able to provide statistics per port or
per  flow.   The  controller  polls  the  edge  switches  for
separate traffic statistics for each flow (a pair of source and
destination  addresses).  The  statistics  include  the  total
number of packets and the total number of bytes.
1.4 Implementation
The  Controller  is  implemented  as  a  Floodlight  module
listening for Packet-In messages.  The IPv4 type messages
contain  information  on  the  source  and  destination  IP
addresses.  The controller creates new rules matching the IP
addresses with the action of outputting the packets to the
appropriate ports.
The  Statistics  Collector  is  implemented  as  a  separate
thread.   At  equal  time  intervals,  the  Statistics  Collector
polls the edge switches and gets per-flow information on
the total number of packets and bytes passed.
In the prototype the Analytics Processor is implemented as
a part of the Statistics Collector.  In a real implementation
the  Statistics  Collector  may  write  traffic  statistics  to  a
database.  For example, a table in the database may contain
such  fields  as:  timestamp,  source  IP, destination  IP, the
number of packets, and the number of bytes.
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A distributed volumetric attack comes from many different
sources.  So,  to  detect  the  distributed  attack,  the  traffic
statistics need to be aggregated by target IP addresses.  This
is a task for the MapReduce algorithm.
Figure 1: Flow path topology
The Analytics Processor uses machine learning algorithms
to analyze traffic  patterns.  When the Analytics  Processor
detects  an  attack,  it  requires  the  Mininet  to  alter  the
network topology by adding a mitigation switch.
2. ANALYTICS 
We will detect malicious traffic based on traffic patterns.
2.1 Basic Case
Let’s  consider  a  simple  case.   A number  of  legitimate
clients make requests to the server and get back a certain
amount of data per second.  Here we assume that traffic is
static, e.g. the rates do not change with time.  A particular
client always requests data at a constant rate. But different
clients consume different amounts of traffic depending on
the user connections, compute power, and performed tasks.
We may apply statistic methods and calculate a distribution
of how many clients have a particular download rate.   A
few clients will have very high or very low rates, while the
bulk  of  the  clients  will  have  rates  around  the  middle.
Generally, the number of clients as a function of the rate
will form a normal distribution as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Normal distribution of baseline traffic
When  an  attack  starts,  malicious  traffic  adds  on.  The
malicious traffic is generated by different sources, so it will
form a normal distribution as well, but the parameters, e.g.,
the  mean  and  the  standard  deviation,  of  the  malicious
traffic are probably different as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Normal distribution of malicious traffic
The statistics  will  show the accumulated (legitimate plus
malicious) traffic as shown in the Figure 4 below.
Figure  4:  Distribution  of  combined  traffic  during  an
attack
The analytic method of decomposing a function into a sum
of  Gaussian  components  is  well-known.   It  is  based  on
finding the minima of the second derivative [6.]
In a one-dimensional case, even though we can calculate
Gaussian components, the legitimate and malicious traffic
is not easily separable.  We can only identify a safe part of
the legitimate traffic and a problematic mixture.
2.2 Multi-Dimensional Case
In a two-dimensional case, the separation is much better. 
The extra dimensions help us to distinguish the bad and the
good  traffic  more  accurately.  Figure  5  is  sourced  from
Wikipedia.
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Figure 5: Multi-dimensional traffic distribution
To  make  our  statistics  multi-dimensional,  we  need  to
collect and analyze more attributes of the traffic. 
OpenFlow switches  provide  the  total  number  of  packets
and the total number of bytes passed for a particular flow
rule.  Also, the controller collects statistics in two directions
- from client to server and from server to client.  This gives
us four dimensions even in the case of constant traffic.
2.3 Dynamic Case
The  simple  case  deals  with  a  static  picture,  and  doesn’t
account for the time dimension, though this information is
also available.  In the dynamic case, when the time factor is
taken  into  consideration,  the  aggregated  traffic  can  be
separated into sessions.  Each session has its leading edge,
a more or less constant pulse, and the tail.
The challenge is that at a given time different sessions are
at  different  phases,  so  we  need  to  normalize  them.
Analyzing a session that started dT time ago, we should cut
all other sessions to the dT intervals from their start time,
and then compare the leading rate patterns.
If a session is idle for a long time we will remove it from
consideration. We may allow some short idle intervals in
order  that  a  session  may  include  more  than  one  active
period.  This introduces such traffic attributes as start time,
average idle time, last slope, average slope, maximal slope,
average rate, maximal rate, etc. These attributes make our
statistics rather high-dimensional.
Note: The dynamic case is left as a subject for future work.
2.4 Clustering
Availability of a number of attributes allows grouping of
similar individual flows into clusters.  Clustering introduces
an additional level of network monitoring.  
2.5 Incremental Case
Even though individual clients may randomly appear and
disappear on the network, the clusters of clients are more
stable.  This suggests  an idea of  maintaining the network
history in terms of clusters.  At certain time intervals, the
controller can refer to network historical records to detect
the  creation  of  new  clusters,  which  is  meaningful  and
informative.
2.6 Other Types of Attacks (out of scope)
To detect  a  TCP flood attack,  the  TCP flags  need  to  be
analyzed.  NetFlow  does  not  allow  the  analysis  of  TCP
packets.   NetFlow  provides  some  statistics  on  the  TCP
flags.  Namely, the flags are accumulated with the logical
OR operation.  The flood attack can be detected by a large
number of packets with TCP flags SYN and ACK. 
Amplification attacks are based on spoofing IP addresses.
Spoofing can  theoretically  be detected at  the edge.   The
edge switch knows what IP address are locally accessible,
because  the  edge  switch  is  responsible  for  delivering
incoming packages to these addresses.  So, if a request is
coming with a foreign source IP address, this indicates a
spoofing case and the package should be dropped.
2.7 Mitigation Possibilities
The best attack mitigation is to drop the malicious traffic.
To  this  end,  the  streaming  analytics  need  to  correctly
classify  some  traffic  as  malicious.  This  classification
process is a candidate for machine learning.  
The  streaming  analytics  evaluates  the  traffic  and  detects
peculiarities by clustering the total traffic volume into a set
of  components.  Each  component  represents  the  traffic
generated  by  a  set  of  similar  sources  (computers,
connections,  tasks  to  perform).  The  malicious  traffic  is
generated  by  few  homogeneous  sources,  while  the
legitimate traffic is quite dispersed.  This gives us a hint on
which is which.
The  evaluation  may  be  less  than  one  hundred  percent
accurate.   If  some  portion  of  malicious  traffic  is  not
dropped, the target server will probably be able to manage
the requests in a normal way; and the attack still won’t be
successful.  If some legitimate traffic is dropped, the bulk
of the legitimate traffic will be processed; and the attack
will be partially successful.
3. A  PROTOTYPE
The Cyber-attack detection simulation prototype includes
analytics and mitigation described above. The prototype is
implemented on single dedicated physical computer.  The
network  is  implemented  on  the  Mininet  simulation
platform.  The prototype is implemented as a module of the
Floodlight  controller.   The  statistics  collector  runs  as  a
separate  Java  thread.  The  traffic  analytics  implement
clustering  and  classification  of  legitimate  and  malicious
client hosts with the help of the Java-ML machine learning
library.
3.1 Topology
We built  a topology representing the following three key
parts of  a  network: client  hosts,  edge switches,  and core
switches as shown in figure 6.
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 Figure 6: Mininet topology
We think that  the  following topology is  general  enough,
while it is still quite easy to generate.
The  network  is  based  on  the  orthogonal  grid  of  core
switches.  In the picture above, the size of the core grid is 3
by 4.  The size is parametrized (as N by M) and is easy to
change.
A set  of  edge  switches  is  connected  to  the  grid  of  core
switches.   There  are  2*N+2*M-4  edge  switches,  i.e.  10
edge switches are shown in the picture.
Each edge switch is linked to K hosts.  There are 30 hosts
in the picture.  We use one host as a server.  We use some of
other hosts as legitimate users, and some as attackers.
3.2 Mininet Configuration
Mininet  is  a  lightweight  virtualization  platform aimed at
emulating  software  defined  networks  with  hundreds  of
switches and hosts.  Mininet employs Linux containers to
implement  Ethernet  interfaces  in  isolated  namespaces,
while the virtual hosts share the same kernel, system and
application code.
Mininet provides a convenient command line interface for
interacting with the emulated network.  In our case this is
not enough.  We are using the Mininet Python API to create
the virtual network topology and to execute batch tests.
net = Mininet( controller=lambda name: 
RemoteController( name, defaultIP='127.0.0.1' ), 
listenPort=6653 )
Mininet SDN networks uses Openvswitches and Openflow
controllers.  In our prototype we use an external Floodlight
controller.
for I in range(1, N):
  for J in range(1, M):
    ss[I][J] = net.addSwitch( 's' + 10*I + J )
Then we can add core and edge switches to the network.
When created, a switch is given a name.  The switch names
follow a  certain  name  convention.  A switch  name starts
with letter S followed by a number, which can’t be zero.
Otherwise  a  random  number  will  be  generated.   The
switches communicate with the controller on a dedicated
port.  We need to store references to the switch object to
create links between switches and switches, or switches and
hosts.
Note:  That  when  a  link  is  created  it  is  associated  with
particular interfaces (ports.)   There is no way to get  that
information from the link object.  So we need to get this
information before creating a link, by calling the newPort
method.  The  method  returns  the  number  of  the  next
available interface, e.g. host-eth80.
for I in range(1, N):
  for J in range(1, M­1):
    p1 = ss[I][J].newPort()
    p2 = ss[I][J+1].newPort()
    net.addLink( ss[I][J], ss[I][J + 1] )
We are adding hosts to the network in the same manner.
for I in range(K):
  h = net.addHost( 'h' + I + 's' + U,
      ip = '10.0.' + U + '.' + I )
  l = net.addLink( h, s, port1=1, port2=80+I )
  cc[x][y][I] = h
Some of hosts are server.  We can start and run a web server
on a particular host by means of the following command.
h.cmd( 'python ­m SimpleHTTPServer 80 &' )
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The web server will run in the current working directory,
e.g.  /opt/mininet/examples/.   We  place  appropriate
index.html files here.
Some  other  hosts  are  clients,  generating  legitimate  and
malicious traffic.  We use curl-loader to generate the traffic.
The curl-loader requires configuration files, which generate
from the python script. 
cc[i][j][k].cmd('curl­loader ­f '+filename+' &')
The configuration files are different for each host.  They
define  different  amount  of  load,  by  using  the
TIMER_AFTER_URL_SLEEP parameter.
# load
y = 180 / t
filename = 'h' + I + 's' + U + '.conf'
target = open(filename, 'w')
target.write("CYCLES_NUM= " + x + "\n")
target.write("URL=http://10.0.11.0/\n")
target.write("REQUEST_TYPE=GET\n")
target.write("TIMER_AFTER_URL_SLEEP = "+y+"00\n")
target.close()
The curl loader runs fine (without any interruption) from
the  Mininet  command  line.   When  running  it  from  the
python  script  (as  described  above,)  we  face  a  strange
limitation of Mininet that the command runs on the host for
60  seconds  only,  then  the  host  stops.   We  haven’t
investigate the Mininet code in this regard.  Instead, we just
limit all our tests to run exactly 1 minute. 
Two  last  pieces  of  the  Mininet  script  are  related  to
communication with the controller. 
First, when the network is generated, we explicitly pass the
topology to the controller.  The topology includes a list of
vertices (hosts and switches) and the list of edges (links)
adjacent to each vertex.  We store this information into a
MySQL database.
import mysql.connector
global cnx
cnx = mysql.connector.connect(user='mininet', 
password='123', host='127.0.0.1', 
database='traffic')
When controller detects an attack, it requests the Mininet to
add a mitigation function to the network.  In the prototype
the mitigation function is simulated by adding a scrubber
switch and linking it to the appropriate edge switch.
We  use  the  database  again,  to  pass  the  requests  from
controller  to  the  Mininet.   The  requests  are  generated
asynchronously,  so  the  python  script  needs  to  poll  the
database periodically.  To this end we launch a concurrent
task. 
import threading
def worker():
    for i in range(720):
        time.sleep(5)
        check()
w = threading.Thread(name='worker', target=worker)
w.setDaemon(True)
w.start()
When a request is found, the scripts adds a new switch to
the network.
sw = net.addSwitch( 's' + str(200+a)  )
The  script  also  adds  appropriate  links  between  the  new
scrubber switch and the old affected switch.  We believe
that one physical link could be used in both directions.   As
for  the  Mininet  simulation,  we  need  two  separate  links.
One of them can be used to throttle the malicious traffic,
but a custom class is needed for links with parameters.
opts = dict(bw=0.1, max_queue_size=1000)
net.addLink( sw, es[a], cls=TCLink, **opts )
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Now the switch is added and connected, but the network
and controller can’t work with it.  The switch needs to be
“started.”  There is no method to start  a switch from the
python  API,  neither  one  of  the  switch  nor  one  of  the
network objects.  The other switches are started implicitly
when the network starts.  So, a workaround is to start the
whole networks after adding a new switch.
net.start()
3.3 Floodlight
The business  logic of  the prototype is  implemented as  a
module for the Floodlight controller.  In the prototype, a
single controller is in charge of the whole test network.
3.3.1 Finding a Path 
When a client sends a request to the server and the server
sends a response to the client, the controller is responsible
for finding a path between the client and the server through
the edge and core switches,  and putting appropriate flow
rules  to  the  switches  involved.   A  classic  example  of
making  paths  through  a  network  topology  is  the  L2
learning switch.
The Find Path module of the prototype works in terms of IP
addresses (i.e. at layer 3,) and assumes a priori knowledge
of the network topology. 
When a client sends a request, the network packet comes to
the edge switch.  Initially the switch has no rules for the
required flow, and sends the first packet to the controller.
To  receive  the  packet,  the  module  needs  to  register  a
PACKET_IN listener.
floodlightProvider.addOFMessageListener(
    OFType.PACKET_IN, findPath);'
The listener receives packets of two types, IPv4 and ARP.
In both cases, the controller can extract information on the
source and destination IP addresses.
if (eth.getEtherType() == EthType.IPv4) {
  IPv4 ipv4 = (IPv4) eth.getPayload();
  line = new Line( ipv4.getDestinationAddress(),
                   ipv4.getSourceAddress() );
  …  return Command.CONTINUE;
}
if (eth.getEtherType() == EthType.ARP) {
  ARP arp = (ARP) eth.getPayload();
  line = new Line( arp.getTargetProtocolAddress(),
                 arp.getSenderProtocolAddress() );
  …  return Command.CONTINUE;
}
Then the controller applies Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the
shortest path between two vertices in a network graph.  In
the prototype, the network topology looks as an orthogonal
(Manhattan)  grid,  so  a  few  paths  are  possible.   The
controller creates and writes the rules for one of the shortest
paths to the switches involved.
OFFactory offactory = ofswitch.getOFFactory();
OFFlowAdd.Builder fmb = offactory.buildFlowAdd();
  Match.Builder builder = offactory.buildMatch();
    builder.setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE,
                     EthType.IPv4);
    builder.setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, a0);
    builder.setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, a1);
  Match match = builder.build();
fmb.setMatch(match);
  OFActions actions = offactory.actions();
    ArrayList<OFAction> actionList =
                 new ArrayList<OFAction>();
      OFActionOutput output = 
      actions.buildOutput().setPort( p ).build();
    actionList.add(output);
fmb.setActions( actionList );
// and write it out
OFFlowAdd X = fmb.build();
ofswitch.write( X );
When everything works correctly, the controller receives 4
requests  for  the same path in a  row:  an ARP flow from
client to server, an IPv4 flow from client to server, an ARP
flow from server to client, and an IPv4 flow from server to
client.  The controller can write the rules for all the four
flows when it receives the first request for a new path. 
3.3.2 Traffic Statistics Collector
The  Statistics  Collector  is  implemented  as  a  concurrent
thread.  The thread is registered when the controller starts
up.
collector =
  threadPoolService
    .getScheduledExecutor()
      .scheduleAtFixedRate(
         new Collector(switchService),
         portStatsInterval, portStatsInterval,
         TimeUnit.SECONDS);
At  equal  time  intervals,  the  Statistics  Collector  polls  all
edge switches.
OFStatsRequest<?> req =
  sw.getOFFactory().buildFlowStatsRequest()
.setMatch(match)
.setOutPort(OFPort.ANY)
.setTableId(TableId.ALL)
.build();
  future = sw.writeStatsRequest(req); 
  values = (List<OFStatsReply>)
               future.get(2, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
The information received for each flow rule includes the
total  number  of  packets  and  the  total  number  of  bytes
passed.
OFFlowStatsReply y = (OFFlowStatsReply) x;
for( OFFlowStatsEntry z : y.getEntries() )
{
  Match m = z.getMatch();
  long pcts = z.getPacketCount().getValue();
  long bytes = z.getByteCount().getValue();
  IPv4Address src = m.get(MatchField.IPV4_SRC);
  IPv4Address dst = m.get(MatchField.IPV4_DST);
  addRate(swid, src.getInt(), dst.getInt(),
          pcts, bytes);
}
The Statistics Collection passes the traffic information to
the Analytics Processor by calling the addRate function.
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3.3.3 Analytics Processor
In  the  prototype  the  controller  accumulates  all  traffic
information  in  one  place.   This  is  a  temporary  solution.
Ideally, the storage and processing of the traffic statistics
should be distributed (MapReduce.)
The  Analytics  Processor  receives  the  total  number  of
packets and bytes per flow (a pair of source and destination
IP addresses.)  What we are interested in is the number of
packets  and  bytes  passed  since  the  last  poll.   So,  the
Analytics Processor has to maintain the last known values,
and to subtract them from the total values.
Then the Analytics  Processor applies a  machine learning
algorithm  to  cluster  the  flows  by  their  sources  (clients)
according their traffic similarities.
import net.sf.javaml.core.*;
import net.sf.javaml.clustering.*;
Dataset data = new DefaultDataset(); 
for( Integer src : server.sources.keySet() )
{
    Info info = server.sources.get(src);
    double[] values = new double[] {
                   info.rateUp, info.rateDown,
                   info.bytesUp, info.bytesDown };
    Instance tmpInstance =
                   new DenseInstance(values);
}
Clusterer km = new KMeans(5);
Dataset[] clusters = km.cluster(data);
3.3.4 Detection
In the prototype, the Controller detects the attacks based on
the  pre-defined  traffic  limit.   If  the  accumulated  traffic
to/from  a  particular  target  exceeds  the  threshold,  the
controller assumes that an attack is taking place.
The controller  analyzes  the  clusters  of  sources  based  on
their  aggregated  statistics:  the  means  and  standard
deviations.  We assume that the malicious traffic has a more
sharp distribution.
3.3.5 Mitigation
To mitigate the suspicious traffic the controller requests the
Mininet to create the scrubber switches and to add them to
the network.
When the scrubber switch is created the controller receives
a switch detected call,
switchService.addOFSwitchListener(initSwitch);
The controller corrects the flow rules so that the suspicious
traffic detour to the new switch.
// CORRECT SOURCE
del_rule(sw1, l.src, l.dst, 1, 20001 );
add_rule(sw1, l.src, l.dst, 200, 30001 );
add_turn(sw1, 0, l.dst, 201, 1, 40003 );
// LOOP
add_rule(sw2, l.src, l.dst, 201, 30002 );
Where 1, 200 and 201 are ports (NICs,) and 20001, etc. are
rule priorities.
3.4 Traffic
In the prototype, we have implemented multi-dimensional
static analytics as described above.  The prototype analytics
expect traffic of two kinds, legitimate and malicious.  We
assume that the litigate traffic is more dispersed.  Ideally,
the rates of legitimate (and malicious) traffic should follow
the normal distribution.
Having  just  few  tens  of  user  hosts  available,  we
approximate  the  normal  distribution  with  a  triangular
distribution  for  legitimate  traffic.   The  triangular
distribution is implemented as a squared (K by K) matrix of
hosts.  The traffic to each host is proportional to the sum of
indices.
As for malicious traffic, for the test purposes we are trying
to make it more distinguishable.  To this end we implement
bad traffic with a uniform distribution.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Working on the prototype, we have to make a couple of
choices  of  technologies  to  use:  Java  or  Python
programming language, Open Daylight or Floodlight SDN
controller, software or hardware simulation.
Our  developers  are  fond  of  using  strictly-typed
programming languages, for they provide stronger control
over  target  programming  code  and  are  less  error-prone.
The developer determined that using Java-ML library is a
convenient way to perform statistical analysis of traffic. 
The Open Daylight controller is a huge elaborated system
with a rich set of functions.  But on the other hand, it turned
out to be hard to comprehend and manage.  Besides, our
developers  observed some instability when involved in a
simulation on the Mininet platform.
The  Floodlight  controller is  simple,  robust,  and  well
documented.  Though, in this case, some calculations are
time sensitive; and the results are known to vary depending
whether the controller is running in the Eclipse IDE or in a
stand-alone mode.
We tried  to  make  our  code  independent  of  a  particular
controller  (Floodlight.)   To this  end  we implemented  all
functions  from the  scratch,  avoiding  third  party  libraries
other than OpenFlowJ-Loxigen.  Still, the module depends
on some Floodlight services and modules, e.g. the topology
discovery.
The Mininet platform is able to simulate a network with
hundreds  of  hosts  and  switches.   Though,  to  run
simultaneously a hundred of test loaders on the simulated
network  is  quite  problematic.   Besides,  the  Mininet
platform imposes a few functional limitations.
The  Java-ML  library  provides  a  number  of  clustering
algorithms,  which  are  surprisingly  successful  in
identifying  well-separated  groups  of  similar  clients.
Unfortunately,  in  this  case,  good  clustering  depends  on
right guessing of a few parameters.  In the lack of a prior
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available  information,  techniques  of  dynamic  clustering
may be of great help. 
The prototype proves that all essential parts of the project
are  considered  in  this  paper.   The  prototype  does  not
simulate and detect real DDoS attacks.  We leave a creation
of a test implementation of this project in the dedicated lab
environment as a subject for future work. 
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